

## Message Text

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P R 291407Z MAY 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0013

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0012

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS  
MAY 28, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0011

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION  
WITH EASTERN REPS ON MAY 28, 1974. PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH  
3 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

4. GDR REP OESER WELCOMED OTHER PARTICIPANTS AND  
BEGAN DISCUSSION. HE SAID THAT, IN EASTERN VIEW, DISCUSSION  
IN LATEST INFORMAL SESSION HAD SHOWN THAT THE QUESTION  
OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS  
CONNECTED WITH THE GENERAL POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE OF  
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BOTH SIDES. IT WAS USEFUL THAT DISCUSSION HAD TAKEN

THIS COURSE BECAUSE, IN DISCUSSING ANY SEGMENT OF THE PROBLEM, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE REAL OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WHICH, IF AGREED, WOULD LEAD DIRECTLY TO FULFILLMENT OF THE AGREED OBJECTIVE TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY IN EUROPE. ON THE LAST OCCASION, POLISH REP HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE SECURITY OF ALL WOULD BE GUARANTEED IF ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. POLISH REP HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THE EAST'S OBJECTIONS OF PRINCIPLE TO A FIRST PHASE CONFINED TO SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS. SUCH A FIRST PHASE WOULD SERVE THE OBJECTIVE OF CHANGING THE EXISTING BALANCE OF POWER IN FAVOR OF NATO; THUS DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. POLISH REP HAD DRAWN CORRECT CONCLUSION THAT AGREED REDUCTIONS WERE ONLY POSSIBLE IF THEY WERE MUTUAL, COMPARABLE IN ACTUAL VALUE, FAIR AND EQUITABLE.

5. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT, DURING THE LATEST INFORMAL SESSION, WESTERN REPS HAD ALSO ARGUED THAT THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POSITION OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THAT OF THE GDR, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS CONCERNED THE DEGREE OF THEIR SUPPORT BY THE UNITED STATES ON THE ONE SIDE AND BY THE USSR ON THE OTHER. BUT LEADERS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES FREQUENTLY SPOKE OF THE GLOBAL BALANCE BETWEEN THE WEST AND EAST. NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WERE EMBEDDED IN THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BALANCE, WHOSE EXISTENCE GAVE SECURITY TO ALL PARTICIPANTS REGARDLESS OF THEIR RELATIVE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION. THE AGREED TASK OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS TASK, THE STATUS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS WAS EQUAL. WESTERN REPS CLAIMED THAT THE EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL HAD LITTLE OR NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND THAT THE RELUCTANCE OF OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO PARTICIPATE IN SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE IN THE MILITARY SENSE. THIS VIEW WAS ERRONEOUS. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDED FOR EQUIVALENT REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THESE REDUCTIONS WERE EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT FROM

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BOTH THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS. PARTICIPATION BY ALL IN THE SYMBOLIC APPROACH WOULD STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS INTENDED SERIOUS REDUCTIONS. THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS THE BEST WAY TO PREPARE THE ROAD FOR THE NEXT 5 PERCENT REDUCTION PHASE, ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE PARTICIPANTS WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE DEMOBILIZED. ALLIED REPS HAD PUT FORWARD A SUGGESTION FOR A FORCE FREEZE. EASTERN REPS WOULD ON PRESENT OCCASION ASK

QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL AND MAKE SOME REMARKS ON IT. BUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL DID STRESS THE CORRECTNESS OF THE VIEW THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD INCUR OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE SEARCH FOR EQUAL AND MUTUAL CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE EQUIVALENT REDUCTIONS OF COMPARABLE VALUE.

6. US REP STATED THAT, AS GDR REP HAD INDICATED, AT LAST SESSION THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE QUESTION OF HOW MUCH SCOPE THERE SHOULD BE IN TREATING THE AGREED SUBJECT OF THE INFORMAL SESSIONS, WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS BELIEVED THIS DISCUSSION HAD BEEN INTERESTING AND WORTHWHILE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD BE MORE IN THE INTERESTS OF PROGRESS IF PARTICIPANTS COULD NARROW THE FOCUS SOMEWHAT AND DISCUSS THE TOPIC OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET IN A SOMEWHAT MORE CONCENTRATED WAY. IN REFLECTING ON LAST DISCUSSION, ALLIED REPS CONCLUDED THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OF HOW THEY INTERPRETED THE AGREE BASIS OF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSION. SO HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO REVIEW WHAT ALLED UNDERSTANDING OF THAT AGREED BASIS WAS: FOR THE TIME BEING, PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO FOCUS DISCUSSIONS IN THE SESSIONS ON ONE SIGNLE ISSUE: THE ISSUE OF WHOE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO DEALING WITH THIS ONE ISSUE, BEFORE MOVING ON TO TRY TO RESOLVE OTHER ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD AMONG PARTICIPANTS THAT DISCUSSION OF THE TOPIC OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM OF EACH SIDE. WEST MAINTAINED ITS PROGRAM, AND WESTERN  
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REPS UNDERSTOOD THAT EAST MAINTAINED ITS PROGRAM.

7. US REP CONTINUED THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION, ALLIED REPS WOULD EXPECT TO REACH NO MORE THAN A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION. IT WOULD BE TENTATIVE BECAUSE IT WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ONLY WHEN PARTICIPANTS HAD SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED THESE ISSUES WOULD THE TENTATIVE CONCLUSION THEY HAD REACHED ON WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET BE CONFIRMED. THIS PROCEDURE RELECTED THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE IN NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS KIND THAT NOTHING WAS DEFINITELY AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING WAS AGREED: THAT IS, UNTIL THERE WAS A COMPLETE PACKAGE, EACH ELEMENT OF WHICH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES WITHIN THE TOTAL CONTEXT.

8. US REP SAID HE MADE THESE POINTS BECAUSE IN SESSION  
ON MAY 22, MR. STRULAK AND MR. SMIRNOVSKY HAD EXPRESSED  
THE VIEW THAT ALLIES WERE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE ACCEPTANCE

OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT A PRE-CONDITION TO ADDRESSING  
THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE  
OUTSET. THIS WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING. INSTEAD, WHAT  
ALLIES WERE SUGGESTING WAS THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD  
AGREE, ON A TENTATIVE BASIS, AS A WORKING HYPOTHESIS

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0012

FROM US REP MBFR

WORTH FURTHER EXPLORATION, ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONLY  
THE US AND SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN  
A FIRST PHASE. SUCH A WORKING HYPOTHESIS WOULD NOT  
INVOLVE PRIOR ACCEPTANCE BY EAST OF THE COMMON CEILING  
CONCEPT. THAT ISSUE WOULD BE DISCUSSED WHEN PARTICIPANTS  
CAME TO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE REDUCTION PROGRAMS

OF EACH SIDE. THE ISSUE BEFORE PARTICIPANTS NOW WAS THE STRICTLY LIMITED ONE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

9. KHESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE TWO MAIN POINTS IN RETURN TO THESE REMARKS. THE FIRST WAS THE QUESTION OF WHAT WAS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS. THIS HAD BEEN AGREED: WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. BUT ALLIED REPS HAD BEEN FIRST DURING DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION TO LAUNCH INTO OTHER  
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ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATION. THE ALLIES, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF A FREEZE ON GROUND FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO TAKE EFFECT FOLLOWING A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. DID THE IDEA OF A FREEZE ACTUALLY FALL UNDER THE HEADING OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET? US REP SAID THIS WAS THE CASE BECAUSE THE EAST HAD MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INCREASE IN THE GROUND FORCES OF OTHER NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSION OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL TO START WITH REDUCTION OF US-SOVIET FORCES FIRST. THAT WAS HOW THE ISSUE HAD GOTTEN ON THE TABLE.

10. KHESTOV SAID THAT, IF PARTICIPANTS DEFINED THE ISSUE AS JUST INDICATED, THE WESTERN IDEA OF A FREEZE WOULD NOT FALL UNDER THE AGREED SUBJECT HEADING. IF ONE WANTED TO TAKE A STRICT VIEW OF THE MATTER, THE TOPIC COULD NOT BE DISCUSSED. BUT THAT WOULD BE ILLOGICAL. US REP COMMENTED THAT AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION INCLUDED AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS ANY PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH FLOWED FROM IT. KHESTOV SAID PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. BUT IN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE, SOME ASPECTS MIGHT EMERGE WHICH FELL UNDER OTHER HEADINGS. FOR EXAMPLE, A FREEZE WAS NOT A REDUCTION AND THEREFORE BY A STRICT APPROACH, NOT GERMANE TO THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. BUT SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WOULD NOT BE REASONABLE. HIS OWN CONCLUSION WAS THAT IT WOULD BE MORE LOGICAL TO DISCUSS ALL ISSUES PERTINENT TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A FREEZE. AFTER ALL, THE ALLIES HAD ALSO COVERED A WIDE FRONT IN INTRODUCING THEIR IDEA ON A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, NETHERLANDS REP HAD SAID ON THE OCCASION OF THE PREVIOUS INFORMAL SESSION THAT WEST DID NOT UNDERSTAND EASTERN ARGUMENTS ON SECURITY AND HAD DELAIED WITH THESE. THEREFORE, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE THAT, UNDER THE AGREED HEADING OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THEY SHOULD DISCUSS EVERYTHING WHICH SEEMS

PERTINENT TO EITHER SIDE. OTHERWISE, PARTICIPANTS WOULD  
CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THEMSELVES. IF ONE PARTICIPANT RAISED  
A TOPIC AS PERTINENT AND OTHERS DISAGREED, THEN THERE  
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WOULD BE DIFFICULTIES. THEREFORE, UNDER THE AGREED HEADING,  
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD HAVE THE FREEDOM TO DISCUSS SUCH  
MATTERS AS THE FREEZE OR SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS AND TO  
EXCHANGE ARGUMENTS AND COUNTER-ARGUMENTS ON THESE  
SUBJECTS.

11. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO TURN TO THE IDEA  
THAT NO PART OF THE SUBJECT MATTER WOULD BE DEFINITELY  
AGREED UNTIL THE REMAINDER WAS AGREED. THE EAST HAD  
AGREED TO INFORMAL SESSIONS IN THE SAME SENSE. AGREEMENT  
IN THEM ON SOME ELEMENT WOULD NOT IMPLY AGREEMENT ON  
ALL. THE EAST HAD THE SAME UNDERSTANDING AS THE WEST ON THIS  
POINT.

12. BELGIAN REP SAID HE AGREED IN GENERAL WITH KHLESTOV'S  
IDEA THAT TOPICS RAISED FOR DISCUSSION SHOULD BE PERTINENT TO THE  
AGREED SUBJECT OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.  
HOWEVER, WHAT ONE SIDE SAID MIGHT NOT APPEAR PERTINENT FROM  
THE BEGINNING, BUT LATER ON ITS PERTINENCE MIGHT BECOME EVIDENT.  
KHLESTOV SAID PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DISCUSS THE AGREED  
QUESTION. SOME NEW IDEAS WOULD EMERGE WHICH MIGHT BE  
CONNECTED WITH THE TOPIC. IF NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED, IT  
COULD BE AGREED THAT THEY WOULD BE DISCUSSED LATER. IT  
WAS NOT DESIRABLE TO BE TOO RIGOROUS IN THIS MATTER OR  
TO ARGUE THE POINT TOO CLOSELY AS TO WHETHER A GIVEN ISSUE  
WERE CONNECTED OR NOT CONNECTED WITH THE AGREED SUBJECT.  
BELGIAN REP AGREED. HE SAID IT WAS THE OBLIGATION OF  
EACH PARTICIPANT TO SHOW THAT HIS POINTS WERE CONNECTED  
WITH THE SUBJECT.

13. FRG REP SAID THE MAIN POINT OF US REP'S INTERVENTION  
HAD BEEN TO REMOVE A MISUNDERSTANDING RAISED BY THE  
EAST ON LAST OCCASION, THAT IT WAS NOT THE  
WESTERN INTENTION TO MAKE EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON  
CEILING A PRE-CONDITION TO SETTLING THE QUESTION OF WHOSE  
FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. HE WISHED TO CONTINUE  
TO MAKE SOME OTHER POINTS RELEVANT TO THE AGREED SUBJECT.

14. FRG REP SAID THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF RESOLVING THE  
QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE  
OUTSET, EAST HAD REPEATEDLY ARGUED THAT, IF ONLY US AND  
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SOVIET FORCES WERE REDUCED IN A FIRST PHASE, THE OTHER  
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD REMAIN FREE  
TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES, PENDING CONCLUSION OF A PHASE II  
AGREEMENT. IN ORDER TO ANSWER THIS CONCERN, AT LAST SESSION  
ALLIED REPS HAD INTRODUCED AN IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT INTO THE

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0012

FROM US REP MBFR

DISCUSSION. SPECIFICALLY, ALLIED REPS TOLD EAST THAT,  
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN FIRST PHASE PROPOSAL AND  
IF THERE IS SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, INCLUDING  
AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND  
FORCES, THE ALLIES MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A FORMULA  
WHICH WOULD SPECIFY THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD EXCEED THE  
OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA ON ITS  
SIDE RESULTING FROM PHASE I WITHDRAWALS.

16. KHLESTOVE QUESTIONED WHETHER FRG REP WAS NOT AGAIN REVERTING TO ESTABLISHING THE COMMON CEILING AS A PRE-CONDITION. FRG REP SAID IT WAS NOT A PRE-CONDITION. US REP SAID THE MENTION OF COMMON CEILING IN THIS CONTEXT AMOUNTED TO ADVANCE NOTICE OF ALLIED VIEWS ON REDUCTIONS. THEY WOULD ADHERE TO THESE VIEWS AND THEY WOULD ALSO MAKE A FINAL DECISION ON PHASING FROM THE VIEWPOINT  
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OF THE OUTCOME ON REDUCTIONS. BUT ALLIES DID NOT ASK EAST TO AGREE NOW TO THE COMMON CEILING. THIS TOPIC SHOULD BE DISCUSSED ALONG WITH DISCUSSION OF THE REDUCTION PROGRAM. KHLESTOV SAID, THEN ALLIES DID NOT CONNECT THE FREEZE WITH THE COMMON CEILING. ALLIES WERE NOT PLACING A CONDITION THAT, IN AGREEING TO A FREEZE, EAST WOULD HAVE TO AGREE ON THE COMMON CEILING. FRG REP SAID ALLIES WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A FREEZE NOW, PROVIDED THAT, WHEN REDUCTIONS WERE DISCUSSED LATER, THIS DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS HAD A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS WAS APPARENTLY REFERENCE TO ALLIED IDEA THAT AGREEMENT ON THE TOPIC OF WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FIRST WOULD BE OF TENTATIVE NATURE. ALLIED REPS REPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.

17. BELGIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT EASTERN REPS OFTEN SUGGESTED THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM OUTSET. HOWEVER, GDR REP HAD JUST SUGGESTED THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OUTSET. THIS WAS AN INTERESTING FORMULATION. IN ORDER TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE, ALLIED REPS WERE SUGGESTING AGREEMENT ON A FIRST PHASE OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS. PARTICIPANTS WOULD DISCUSS COMMON CEILING LATER.

18. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIED REPS HAD TOLD EAST THAT SUCH A FORMULA WOULD COVER THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS ALLIES HAD PROPOSED BUT, IN ANY EVENT, IT WOULD BE OF FIXED DURATION. ITS LENGTH WOULD BE SPECIFIED LATER. IT WOULD BE SUPERSEDED BY THE COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ACHIEVED IN THE SECOND PHASE. FRG REP SAID THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP. ALLIES BELIEVED THAT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER POINTS THEY HAD MADE, IT PROVIDED A REASONABLE ANSWER TO EASTERN CONCERNS ABOUT WESTERN PARTICIPATION UNDER WESTERN TWO-PHASE PROGRAM. THROUGH A FORMULA OF THE TYPE HE HAD DESCRIBED, ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE PARTICIPATING FROM THE OUTSET BY ACCEPTING SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS ON THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION. MOREOVER, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ASSURED THAT WESTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD NOT BE INCREASED BETWEEN PHASES. THUS, BOTH THE POLITICAL INTEREST AND THE SECURITY CONCERN EAST HAD



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EXPRESSED IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE MET. THE FORMULA ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED WOULD REPRESENT A VERY IMPORTANT COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. FOR THIS REASON, AN ACTUAL COMMITMENT COULD ONLY BE ENTERED INTO IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT. WESTERN PURPOSE IN MAKING THESE POINTS TO EAST WAS TO SHOW EAST HOW, IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES ALLIES HAD PROPOSED, THE CONCERN EAST HAD EXPRESSED REGARDING WEST EUROPEAN FORCES COULD BE MET. ALLIES HOPED EAST WOULD GIVE ALLIES ITS POSITIVE REACTION IN PRESENT SESSION TO ALLIED SUGGESTION SO THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS RESOLVING THE QUESTION BEFORE THEM, WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

19. KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS HAD A FEW QUESTIONS TO ASK IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PRESENTATION. SMIRNOVSKY SAID FRG REP HAD JUST MENTIONED FIXED DURATION OF NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT. THIS ASPECT WAS JUST ONE POINT AND NOT THE MAIN ISSUE CONNECTED WITH THIS PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, DID IT MEAN THAT IF PHASE II WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL, WEST WOULD BE FREE TO INCREASE ITS GROUND FORCE LEVELS?

20. US REP SAID ALLIES WERE SURE THAT IF THERE WERE A SUCCESSFUL PHASE I, PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO ESTABLISH A PERIOD OF TIME OF REASONABLE LENGTH FOR REACHING AN OUTCOME OF PHASE II. WHEN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN PHASE II, THE NEW LEVELS SET THERE WOULD REPLACE THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT WITH AGREED LEVELS.

21. KHLESTOV SAID FRG REP HAD MENTIONED THAT THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD WOULD BE SPECIFIED LATER. HOW LONG DID THE ALLIES HAVE IN MIND THAT THE COMMITMENT ON FREEZING WOULD LAST, UNTIL PHASE II WAS AGREED WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME? BUT WHAT IF IT WERE NOT? ASSUMING THERE WOULD BE A FIXED PERIOD OF TWO TO FOUR YEARS AND NO RESULT FROM PHASE II, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN THEN?

22. US REP SAID THE DURATION OF THIS PERIOD WOULD BE FIXED DURING THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. KHLESTOV SAID  
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THAT IF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS DID REACH AGREEMENT OR IF THEY

DID FAIL, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN THEN? US REP SAID IT WAS  
TRUE THAT THERE WAS A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY THAT THE

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0012

FROM US REP MBFR

WESTERN NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT MIGHT EXPIRE PRIOR TO  
A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF PHAE II NEGOTIATIONS. BUT  
IF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WERE MAKING GOOD PROGRESS, IT  
MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WULD BE POSSIBLE TO  
PROLONG THE COMMITMENT.

23. BELGIAN REP SAID ALLIES WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER THE  
LENGTH OF THE PERIOD INVOLVED. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO  
LIMIT IT TO TWO YEARS. IT COULD BE LONGER, THUS PROVIDING  
INSURANCE FOR A PHASE II OUTCOME. IT WAS NOT THE ALLIED  
DESIRE TO IMPOSE SOME ARBITRARY TIME LIMIT ON PHASE II  
NEGOTIATIONS.

24. GDR REP ASKED, WHAT IF PHASE II SHOULD FAIL? APPARENTLY

ALLIES HAD IT IN MIND THAT THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET  
FORCES WOULD BE WITHOUT A TIME LIMIT. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN  
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TO THOSE OBLIGATIONS IF PHASE II FAILED? FRG REP SAID  
INTENTION OF NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT WAS TO BRIDGE THE  
PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. ALLIES WERE OPTIMISTIC  
OF A PHASE II OUTCOME IN THE EVENT THAT A FIRST PHASE  
AGREEMENT WERE REACHED.

25. SMIRNOVSKY SAID EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY POINTED  
OUT THAT FOR THE WEST MERELY TO ASSUME AN OBLIGATION TO  
START NEGOTIATIONS ON A SECOND PHASE WAS NOT ENOUGH.  
NOW ALLIED REPS HAD REPLIED TO QUESTION JUST RAISED BY  
GDR REP THAT THE OBLIGATION UNDERTAKEN ON THE WITHDRAWAL  
OF US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD CONTINUE BUT THE FREEZE  
COMMITMENT UNDERTAKEN BY OTHER ALLIES WOULD BE LIMITED  
IN TIME. IT WAS MANIFEST THAT THESE WERE DIFFERENT KINDS  
OF OBLIGATIONS. FRG REP SAID THAT IT WAS TRUE THAT THE  
NO-INCREASE PROVISION WOULD DROP UNLESS THERE WAS  
AGREEMENT TO EXTEND IT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS DEMONSTRATED  
THE POINT THAT THESE WERE OBLIGATIONS OF DIFFERENT QUALITY,  
ONE OF INDEFINITE LENGTH, AND ONE LIMITED. FRG REP SAID  
THIS POINT WOULD BE VALID FOR BOTH SIDES SINCE A NO-INCREASE  
COMMITMENT WOULD ALSO INVOLVE THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS.  
IT WOULD NOT BE O UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE  
TO ONE SIDE, BUT BOTH SIDES WOULD ALSO BE FREED OF OBLIGATION BY  
ITS POSSIBLE LAPSE. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS REPLY WAS NOT VERY  
HELPFUL. WHAT IF NEGOTIATION OF PHASE II WERE PROTRACTED  
OR FAILED? THEN WEST WOULD BE FREE FROM ITS OBLIGATION  
OF FIXED DURATION. FRG REP SAID IF THE NO-INCREASE  
OBLIGATION WERE OF UNLIMITED DURATION, IT COULD BE  
CONSIDERED BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER AS AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE  
TO A PHASE II AGREEMENT. ALLIES HAD SAME INTEREST AS  
EAST TO ENSURE THAT NO ONE MADE ARTIFICIAL DIFFICULTIES  
DURING PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE, THE NO-INCREASE  
OBLIGATION HAD TO BE OF TEMPORARY CHARACTER. SMIRNOVSKY  
COMMENTED THAT THIS DISCUSSION HAD CLEARLY SHOWN WEAKNESS OF THE  
WESTERN NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL.

26. US REP SAID APPARENTLY EASTERN PROBLEM WAS EASTERN  
CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE USA AND USSR WOULD BE  
ASSUMING ENDURING OBLIGATIONS. IF THAT WAS THE ISSUE,  
EASTERN REPS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE US REDUCTION  
WAS ALSO PERMANENT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID PERHAPS THERE WAS SOME  
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MISUNDERSTANDING HERE. IF NO AGREEMENT WERE REACHED IN PHASE II, NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FIXED PERIOD OF THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT EXPIRED, WOULD THIS NOT MEAN THAT THE PHASE I OBLIGATIONS FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND USA WERE ALSO VOIDED? US REP SAID NO; IT MEANT THAT BOTH US AND USSR COMMITMENTS WOULD CONTINUE EVEN THOUGH OTHER OBLIGATIONS MIGHT EXPIRE. KHLESTOV SAID THIS POINT CONFIRMED QUESTION ORIGINALLY RAISED BY GDR REP AND SMIRNOVSKY: IT WAS MANIFEST THAT SOVIET OBLIGATIONS WOULD CONTINUE WHILE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD DISAPPEAR.

27. BELGIAN REP SAID THIS WAS ONE HYPOTHETICAL OUTCOME, BUT IT WAS THE WORST CASE POSSIBILITY AND MOST UNLIKELY. MOREOVER, FOR THE GREAT POWERS TO LIMIT THE DURATION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OUTSET WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE IT WOULD SUGGEST A PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT ON THEIR PART OF FURTHER POSSIBILITIES AT THE TIME PHASE I WAS CONCLUDED.

28. SMIRNOVSKY SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. TO REFER TO ANOTHER POINT, ALLIED REPS HAD MENTIONED EASTERN RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE COMMON CEILING. THIS WAS PUTTING THE CASE MILDLY. THE EAST OPPOSED THE COMMON CEILING, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT WAS LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES. BUT THE WEST COULD TAKE INTS STAND ON PHASE II, DRAGGING OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS THEN THE WHOLE ENTERPRISE COULD DISAPPEAR AND THERE THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WITH AN OBLIGATION AND NO PHASE II OUTCOME.

29. US REP SAID ALLIES BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD PERSUADE EAST TO AGREE TO THE COMMON CEILING ALREADY IN PHASE I. IF ONE COULD AGREE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARGUMENT THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE, THEN THE WEST WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE MOTIVE TO COMPLETE PHASE II AS THE WEST CONSIDERED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COMMON CEILING AS A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS ASSUMED EAST WOULD ACCEPT WESTERN PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO MAKE NO-INCREASE POSSIBILITY WORKABLE. THIS WAS A WEAK ASSUMPTION.

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30. BELGIAN REP SAID, WHATEVER LABEL WAS GIVEN TO THE OUTCOME DESIRED BY THE WEST, WHETHER IT WAS CALLED COMMON CEILING OR NOT, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THIS OUTCOME WERE ACCEPTED BY THE EAST WOULD BE RESOLVED ALREADY IN THE FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATION AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT BE A ROADBLOCK FOR PHASE II AND COULD NOT BE USED TO DRAG IT OUT.

31. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS MEANT ALLIES MIGHT NO LONGER INSIST ON THE NAME COMMON CEILING BUT THEY WOULD INSIST ON PARITY AND THIS WOULD HAVE THE SAME EFFECT. FRG REP SAID THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD BRING AGREEMENT ON THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE TWO PHASES, SO THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM HERE. MOREOVER, IF THE SOVIETS DID NOT AGREE TO THE FIRST PHASE, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE ASSUMED ANY ENDURING OBLIGATION OF THE KIND SMIRNOVSKY WAS WORRYING ABOUT.

32. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT THEN IF THERE WAS A COMMON CEILING, IT WOULD PREJUDGE THE SECOND PHASE AND IN EFFECT EVERYTHING WOULD BE DECIDED IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. THIS WAS THE SAME APPROACH TAKEN BY THE EAST. GDR REP SAID IF EVERYTHING WOULD BE SO CLEAR FROM THE FIRST PHASE OUTCOME, THEN THE ALLIES WOULD NOT NEED ASSURANCE ON THE TIME LIMIT OF THE NO-INCREASE PROVISION. IF THEY HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE PHASE II COUTCOME, THEY COULD TRUST IN THIS AND WOULD NOT HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT LIMITING THEIR NO-INCREASE PROVISION.

33. US REP SAID WITH REGARD TO A FREEZE WITHOUT TIME LIMIT, ALLIES BELIEVED THAT THE GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS NOT EQUITABLE. HOWEVER, A PERMANENT AND ENDURING NO-INCREASE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF ACCEPTING AND PERPETUATING THE PRESENT RELEATIONSHIP OF FORCES. THE ALLIES WERE UNWILLING TO DO THIS. BUT THEY WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE TEMPORARILY LIMITATION AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF PHASE II.

34. KHLESTOV SAID ALLIED REPS HAD LAID CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON THE DIFFERING NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US. BUT SOME COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE ENTERING  
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UPON THE SAME TYPE OF OBLIGATIONS AS THOSE WITHIN THE AREA. FOR EXAMPLE, BRITISH AND CANADIAN FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WERE BY ANY STANDARD FOREIGN TROOPS. HOWEVER, THE WESTERN REPS WISHED TO TREAT THEM IN THE SAME WAY AS THOSE WITH TERRITORY IN THE AREA. BUT THE SITUATION OF CANADA AND

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FROM US REP MBFR

THE UK WAS NOT THE SAME AS THAT OF COUNTRIES SITUATED  
WITHIN THE AREA. THERE WERE NO FOREIGN TROOPS ON THE  
TERRITORIES OF THE UK AND CANADA. TO THE CONTRARY, THEY HAD  
FOREIGN TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEIR CASE DIFFERED FROM THAT OF  
OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

35. FRG REP SAID ALLIES WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE  
EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL THAT THE OVERALL LEVEL OF FORCES WOULD  
NOT BE INCREASED. IHLESTOV SAID THAT THE SITUATION OF THE UK AND  
CANADA WAS NOT THE SAME AS OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.  
THEY WERE FOREIGN FORCES. THEY WOULD BE WITHDRAWING THEIR  
FORCES TO THEIR HOMELANDS. THEY WOULD NOT REDUCE THEIR  
FORCES. THEY WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME OBLIGATIONS AS  
THOSE WITHIN THE AREA.

36. FRG REP SAID ALLIES HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE UK WAS

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A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND DID NOT WISH TO  
BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE

COMMUNITY.CANADA TOO DID NOT WISH TO BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. SOVIET REPS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT ALL WOULD UNDERTAKE THE SAME OBLIGATIONS UNDER ALLIED NO-INCREASE POSSIBILITY.

37. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED, WHAT ABOUT THE UK? IT HAD A DIFFERENT SITUATION FROM THE FRG. ALLIES CLAIMED THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD BE LIMITING THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION. THIS COMMENT DID NOT COVER THE SITUATION OF THE UK. IT WAS IN THE SAME POSITION AS THE US AND USSR. KHLESTOV SAID IF EAST FOLLOWED THE WESTERN RATIONALE ON THIS POINT, FOR THOSE COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA THE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THOSE OUTSIDE THE AREA. NOT MERELY PART OF THEIR TROOPS WOULD BE COVERED, AS WITH THOSE OUTSIDE THE AREA, BUT ALSO THEIR WHOLE TERRITORY WOULD BE COVERED. THE GDR, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE IN THE SAME POSITION, AS WAS LUXEMBOURG IN THE WEST. BUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UK AND CANADA WERE NOT THE SAME. REDUCING UK AND CANADIAN FORCES WOULD MEAN WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES TO THEIR HOME TERRITORIES, NOT DEMOBILIZATION. SECOND, THEIR WHOLE TERRITORIES WOULD NOT BE COVERED BY REDCUTIONS SINCE THEY WERE NOT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THERE OBLIGATIONS WOLD BE OF THE SAME NATURE AS THOSE UNDERTAKEN BY THE US AND USSR AND NOT THE SAME AS THOSE UNDERTAKEN BY THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIES WERE WITHIN THE AREA. WESTERN EXPLANATION THAT THE UK WAS A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEANT NOTHING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER ALL, THE USSR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND GDR WERE ALL MEMBERS OF COMECON. THIS FACT TOO MEANT NOTHING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. HIS CONCLUSION WAS THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE WESTERN ARGUMENTATION ITSELF TO TREAT THE UK AND THE FRG IN THE SAME WAY AS OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

38. FRG REP ASKED KHLESTOV WHAT HIS PRACTICAL CONCLUSION FROM THIS ARGUMENT WAS. WOULD EAST WISH FOREIGN FORCES TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM NATIONAL FORCES? THE EASTERN POSITION WAS THAT ALL SHOULD BE IN FROM THE  
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OUTSET. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD BEEN COMMENTING ON THE WESTERN POSITION. THE EAST CONTINUED TO WANT ALL TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. FRG REP SAID THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS DIFFERENT FROM COMECON. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAD TAKEN A DECISION TO MOVE TOWARDS A POLITICAL UNION BY 1980. KHLESTOV SAID THE AGREEMENT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE REACHING WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE NEXT THREE YEARS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT CHANCES WERE FOR MEETING THE 1980 DEADLINE FOR EUROPEAN POLITICAL

UNION. ONE COULD NOT MAKE THE AGREEMENT DEPENDENT ON A POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT. PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE TALKING ABOUT EVENTS WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT 3-5 YEARS

FRG REP SAID THE ISSUE OF EUROPEAN UNITY WAS NOT THAT UNCLEAR AS FAR AS WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE CONCERNED SINCE THEY HAD DECIDED TO FORM A POLITICAL UNION. AS FAR AS HE KNEW. THIS WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE MEMBERS OF COMECON. KHLESTOV SAID IN THAT EVENT, PARTICIPANTS COULD INCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF RECONSIDERING THE TREATY IN THE FUTURE OR PERHAPS HAVE SOME FORMULA SUCH AS THE TEST BAN TREATY WHEREBY AFTER 5 YEARS ALL PARTICIPANTS COULD RECONSIDER.

39. BELGIAN REP SAID THAT THE PRESENT DISCUSSION WAS ABOUT PHASING. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT SOME WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD MORE COMPLICATED PROBLEMS IN REDUCING THEN THE US AND USSR. BUT THIS WAS ONLY ONE OF THE ALLIED ARGUMENTS ON THIS POINT. THE MAIN OTHER ARGUMENT WAS THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GREAT POWERS FOR DETENTE. OTHER PARTICIPANTS LOOKED TO THE GREAT POWERS TO TAKE THE LEAD. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION THE ALLIES HAD STRESSED FROM THE OUTSET. ALL WERE EQUAL BUT SOME MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS AND THE LATTER SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD.

40. KHLESTOV SAID IF THE DIFFERENCE OF SITUATION BETWEEN THE FOUR WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WITHIN THE AREA AND REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT THE REASON FOR THEIR RELUCTNACE TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, WHAT WAS THE WEST'S MAIN REASON FOR NOT WISHING TO DO SO? CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THERE WERE THREE COUNTRIES IN EAST AND FOUR IN WEST. THIS  
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WHOLE GROUP SHOULD ACT IN SAME WAY. BELGIAN REP SAID THAT ADDING COUNTRIES TOGETHER WAS NOT A FUNCTIONAL ARGUMENT. ALLIES CONSIDERED THAT THE WEIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY LAY WITH THE GREAT POWERS AND THEY SHOULD MAKE THE FIRST MOVE.

41. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE WARSAW PACT ALLIES OF THE USSR WERE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. WHY WAS THIS NOT TRUE FOR THE NATO ALLIES? THE REASONS JUST ADVANCED BY BELGIAN REP AMOUNTED TO SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD REDUCE TWICE AS MUCH AS THE US FROM THE OUTSET AND THEN THAT WOULD BE AN ADEQUATE EXAMPLE WHICH COULD BE FOLLOWED. THE THREE ALLIES OF THE USSR IN THE AREA HAD 50 PERCENT OF THE FORCES. THE THREE OR FOUR COUNTRIES CONCERNED ON THE WESTERN SIDE HAD THE SAME WEIGHT OR MORE. THEY SHOULD BE TREATED THE SAME.



42. FRG REP SAID ALLIED REPS HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD COVER THE WHOLE TERRITORIES OF THOSE WITHIN THE AREA POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR HAD A DIFFERENT SITUATION. THEY WERE UNDER A LARGER SOVIET UMBRELLA. THE US UMBRELLA WAS SMALLER AS CONCERNED THE NUMBER OF TROOPS.

43. BELGIAN REP SAID IT WAS NOT THAT OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT PREPARED TO REDUCE. THEY WERE PREPARED TO REDUCE ALTHOUGH NOT AT ONCE. THE REASON WHY THEY HAD ADVANCED THE NO-INCREASE FORMULA WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THIS. ALLIES SAW THE FIRST PHASE AS ONE IN WHICH THE MAJOR POWERS TOOK THE LEAD, FOR REASONS STATED. BUT THE ALLIES WERE WILLING TO PROVE THEIR READINESS TO REDUCE THROUGH A NO-INCREASE FORMULA. DURING THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, POLISH REP HAD SAID THE NO-INCREASE IDEA WAS VERY SIMILAR TO THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND THEREFORE ALLIES SHOULD ACCEPT THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL.

44. AS REGARDS THESE REMARKS, HE WOULD COMMENT AS FOLLOWS:  
IF IN EAST'S VIEW THE TWO IDEAS WERE THE SAME AS FAR AS EAST IS CONCERNED, THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION IS FOR EAST TO ACCEPT ALLIED PROPOSAL. IF THE OBJECTIVE OF EAST'S SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS TO ENSURE THAT OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT INCREASE THEIR FORCES BETWEEN THE PHASES, THIS COULD  
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MORE SIMPLY AND EASILY BE ACHIEVED BY A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT. IF ON THE OTHER HAND, EASTERN OBJECTIVE WAS WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS, THEN THE CASE WAS A DIFFERENT ONE. IN THE LATTER

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FROM US REP MBFR

CASE, EAST WAS OVERLOOKING THE IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN A NO-INCREASE FORMULA OF THE TYPE ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED, AND SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS OF THE TYPE EAST HAD PROPOSED. EASTERN REMARKS ALSO IGNORED THE POINTS IT HAD MADE TO EAST IN THE PREVIOUS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS AS TO WHY WEST COULD NOT AGREE TO SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS.

45. BELGIAN REP SAID THERE WERE FOUR IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NO-INCREASE FORMULA ALLIES WERE SUGGESTING AND EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL:

A. A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER COULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE WEST ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A PHASE I REDUCTION PROGRAM SUCH AS WEST HAD SUGGESTED. THIS WOULD INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, WHICH ARE LACKING UNDER EASTERN SYMBOLIC  
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REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL.

B. THE NO- INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT ALSO OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING, THUS CREATING CONFIDENCE THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS CONTRIBUTE TO ACHIEVEMENT OF AN EQUITABLE GOAL; SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT DO THIS, THEY WOULD MERELY PERPETUATE THE PRESENT SITUATION AT SLIGHTLY LOWER FORCE LEVELS.

C. REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS, WOULD BE OF A LASTING NATURE. THE NO- INCREASE COMMITMENT ALLIES WERE SUGGESTING WOULD BE OF LIMITED DURATION, PENDING A FURTHER REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

D. IT IS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT REDUCTION IS MORE DIFFICULT THAN A NO-INCREASE AGREEMENT.

46. BELGIAN REP SAID ALLIES HAD BEEN OUTLINING THESE POINTS IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT THEIR SUGGESTION FOR A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT WAS NOT A WAY OF EXCAPING FROM OBLIGATIONS BUT A WAY OF DEALING WITH EASTERN CONCERNS. ALLIES CONSIDERED THIS PROPOSAL A MORE EFFECTIVE WAY OF DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE EAST THAN THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL EAST HAD ADVANCED.

47. GDR REP SAID WESTERN STARTING POINT WAS THAT US AND USSR SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD. BUT AS FAR AS GDR WAS CONCERNED, FRG AND UK FORCES HAD EQUAL IMPORTANCE. VIEWING THE MATTER FROM A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOCUS, THEY WERE NOT LESS IMPORTANT THAT THE US, SO BELGIAN REP'S GREAT POWER ARGUMENT WAS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THEM. THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT PUT ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE SAME POSITION. THEY WOULD ALSO ASSUME EQUAL OBLIGATIONS, THUS, ELIMINATING THE INVIDIOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REDUCTIONS ON THE PART OF THE US AND USSR, WHILE OTHER TOOK NO REDUCTIONS. THE CONFIDENCE ARGUMENT WAS NOT CONVINCING. ALLIES ARGUED THAT WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NEEDED A US/SOVIET EXAMPLE TO GIVE THEM CONFIDENCE. THIS MIGHT BE TRUE FOR WEST. BUT IF PARTICIPANTS WOULD AGREE TO PARALLEL REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EVERYONE COULD HAVE CONFIDENCE, EASTERN

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AS WELL AS WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. THERFORE, THE ADVANTAGES OF A PROPOSAL FOR SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS ERE OBVIOUS.

48. FRG REP SAID IT WAS FLATTERING FOR THE UK AND FRG TO BE EQUATED WITH THE US AND USSR AS GREAT POWERS, BUT IT WAS NOT REALISTIC. THE US AND USSR WERE THE TWO WORLD POWERS WITH SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SAFEGUARDING THE SECURITY OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. MOREOVER, THEY HAD SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS NUCLEAR POWERS. THEIR REDUCTIONS WOULD ONLY INVOLVE WITHDRAWAL AND, IN THE CASE OF THE USSR, REDEPLOYMENT FOR A SHORT DISTANCE. IT WAS EASIER FOR THEM TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP. AS FOR CONFIDENCE, THIS SHOULD BE CREATED BY THE EXAMPLE OF THE TWO MAJOR WORLD POWERS. CONFIDENCE THAT OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT TRYING TO EVADE OR CIRCUMBENT REDUCTIOS WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE PROPOSED NON-INCREASE PROVISION.

49. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHETHER WESTERN NON-INCREASE CONCEPT COVERED LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS. US REP SAID ALLIED REPS HAD EXPLAINED AT LENGTH WHY THEY CONSIDERED REDUCTIONS SHOULD FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES. THAT WAS WHY THEY HAD LIMITED PRESENT

PROPOSAL TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. AS THEY HAD EMPHASIZED, GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF MILITARY STRENGTH AND THE ONE WHOSE INCREASE COULD GIVE RISE TO CONCERN. IT WAS THE FOCAL ELEMENT TO CONTROL.

50. SMIRNOVSKY SAID HE HAD ASKED THIS QUESTION BECAUSE WHEN ALLIES SPOKE OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS, THEY INCLUDED SOVIET TANKS IN THESE REDUCTIONS. IN THE MEANWHILE, IT HAD BECOME KNOWN THAT THE NATO COUNTRIES DID NOT INTEND TO INCREASE THEIR MANPOWER IN THE NEAR FUTURE ANYWAY, BUT DID INTEND TO INCREASE THEIR ARMAMENTS. SMIRNOVSKY THEN QUOTED A REMARK BY UK DEFENSE SECRETARY MASON TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES WOULD INCREASE THEIR TANK FORCES IN 1973-1974 BY SOME 800 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THIS STATEMENT DEMONSTRATED THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE ALLIED POSITION. THE ALLIES WERE ASKING THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW MEN AND TANKS. THE ALLIES WERE ENGAGED IN INCREASING THEIR OWN ARMAMENTS. BUT THEY WERE WILLING ONLY TO COVER MANPOWER IN A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT. THEY WERE ASKING THE SOVIET UNION TO REDUCE TANKS WHILE THE WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES WERE INCREASING TANKS.

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51. US REP SAID A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON GROUND FORCES WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON ALL FORCE LEVELS, EVEN IF IT DID NOT REFER EXPRESSLY TO TANKS. THE ALLIES WERE PROPOSING AN OVERALL LIMIT. THIS WAS A VERY SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENT ON THEIR PART. EASTERN REPS HAD IN PRESENT SESSION SUGGESTED THAT THE CONCEPT CONTAINED SOME PROBLEMS. THIS MIGHT BE. BUT PARTICIPANTS WERE DEALING WITH A VERY IMPORTANT LIMITATION IN THE PRESENT CASE. IF THE WEST EUROPEANS WERE WILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES THAT THEIR GROUND FORCES WOULD NOT INCREASE, THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT COMMITMENT AND SHOULD BE SO TREATED BY THE EAST. SMIRNOVSKY REPEATED THAT THIS WOULD MEAN THE SOVIETS WOULD REDUCE THEIR TANKS AND WEST EUROPEANS INCREASE THEIR TANKS. THIS WAS INEQUITABLE. US REP SAID SOVIETS HAD RAISED A PRACTICAL PROBLEM. PERHAPS ONE COULD THINK MORE ABOUT IT AFTER PARTICIPANTS HAD REACHED SOME CONCLUSIONS ON ACTUAL REDUCTIONS. BUT THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENT. THE EAST SHOULD LOOK AT THIS IN A BROAD PERSPECTIVE.

52. SMIRNOVSKY SAID BELGIAN REP HAD NOT CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD POINT RAISED BY POLISH REP IN PREVIOUS INFORMAL SESSION. LATTER HAD NOT CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NO INCREASE PROVISION AND SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS. HE HAD SAID THAT IF THE WEST WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A FREEZE, THEN WEST HAD TRAVELED HALF WAY TO SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS. THEN HE HAD SAID WHAT DIFFERENCE WOULD IT MAKE FOR THE WEST TO UNDERTAKE

A COMMITMENT TO SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS IF THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO REDUCE FORCES. ACCORDING TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, ONLY TWO PARTICIPANTS REDUCED AND THE OTHERS DID SOMETHING DIFFERENT.

53. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO RAISE A FEW MORE POINTS IN ORDER TO HAVE A FULLY CLEAR PICTURE. IF STRULAK AND HIS OTHER EASTERN COLLEAGUES SPOKE OF SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS, ONE POINT SHOULD BE STRESSED WHICH HE WISHED TO REPEAT FOR A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING. THE IDEA OF SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS, RAISED AT THE END OF THE SECOND ROUND OF THE VIENNA TALKS, HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AS A WAY TOWARD POSSIBLE PROGRESS IN NEGOT  
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IATIONS. AT THAT TIME, EASTERN REPS HAD EXPLAINED TO WEST WHY THEY CONSIDERED THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE APPROACH INEQUITABLE. WESTERN REPS HAD AT THAT TIME TOLD EASTERN REPS THAT WEST WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT EASTERN PLAN AS A WHOLE. THEN EASTERN REPS HAD SAID, LET'S WORK OUT A WAY TO INSURE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND SEEK TO DEFINE STEPS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT EASY TO MAKE PROGRESS LATER. IT HAD NOT BEEN AND WAS NOT EAST'S INTENTION TO FORMALLY PROPOSE THAT WEST SHOULD ACCEPT THIS SYMBOLIC REDUCTION CONCEPT AS SUCH. IT WAS JUST A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION TO WORK OUT TOGETHER TO FIND A SOLUTION TO ENABLE THE TALKS TO GET AHEAD. IN SECOND ROUND, ALLIED REPS HAD EMPHASIZED THAT ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES THEY HAD WITH THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT WOULD FREEZE THE WHOLE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON BOTH SIDES. SOME ALLIED

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REPS SAID THAT EVEN SMALL REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A FREEZE ON THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THAT THEREFORE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL. POLISH REP HAD THEREFORE EMPHASIZED IN THIS SENSE THAT, NOW THAT THE ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A FREEZE, THIS OBSTACLE TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION CONCEPT ALSO DISAPPEARED.

54. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, FROM THE EASTERN VIEWPOINT, THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A FREEZE AND REDUCTIONS. REDUCTIONS WERE THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. TO REDUCE MENT TO BRING DOWN THE LEVEL OF FORCES, WHILE A FREEZE LEFT THE FORCE LEVEL WHERE IT STOOD. BUT IF A PARTICIPATING COUNTRY REDUCED ITS MANPOWER BY 1,000 MEN THIS WOULD BE A REDUCTION BUT ITS PRACTICAL EFFECT WOULD BE A FREEZE. SO ON THIS BASIS, EASTERN REPS HAD THE

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IMPRESSION THAT ONE OF WEST'S DIFFICULTIES WITH SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS HAD NOW DISAPPEARED. CONCERNING WESTERN ARGUMENTS AGAINST SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS AS SUCH, THE FIRST TWO ARGUMENTS USED BY BELGIAN REP BOILED DOWN TO THE FACT THAT SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS WERE NOT TIED IN DIRECTLY TO THE WESTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD TOLD WEST THAT THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION IDEA WAS NOT TIED TO THE EASTERN PLAN EITHER. ITS INTENTION WAS TO ALLOW PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE AHEAD SINCE NEITHER SAIDE WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE OVERALL APPROACH OF THE OTHER AND BECAUSE A FIRST STEP LINKED WITH THE MAIN APPROACH OF EITHER SIDE THEREFORE WOULD NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. IF ALLIED REPS WERE SERIOUS IN SEEKING A FIRST STEP, THEN WHY SHOULD THEY TIE SUCH A FIRST STEP SO DIRECTLY TO THEIR OWN PLAN? THE EAST COULD DO THE SAME. BUT EASTERN

REPS HAD INTENTIONALLY REFRAINED FROM DOING SO. IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS, BOTH SIDES SHOULD ABSTAIN SIMILARLY. IF THE WEST INSISTED ON TYING THEIR FIRST STEP TO THEIR OVERALL APPROACH. THEN THE EAST WOULD DO SO ALSO, BUT NEITHER SIDE WOULD ACCEPT THE PLAN OF THE OTHER, SO THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE FACED BY DEADLOCK. SO THE EAST WAS NOT TYING IN ITS FIRST PROPOSED STEP TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF ITS OVERALL PLAN. THE WEST SHOULD FOLLOW SUIT, AND NEITHER SIDE SHOULD TIE IN THE FIRST STEP WITH THEIR OWN OVERALL APPROACH. THEN PROGRESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

55. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT WEST'S THIRD ARGUMENT WAS THAT REDUCTIONS WERE OF A LASTING NATURE, WHILE NO-INCREASE PROVISION SHOULD BE LIMITED IN TIME. THE WEST WAS APPARENTLY WILLING TO ACCEPT A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR A LIMITED PERIOD ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SOMETHING ELSE WOULD BE ACHIEVED LATER. THIS APPROACH WAS LOGICALLY CORRECT BECAUSE THERE SHOULD BE SOME FIRST STEP THAT WOULD ENABLE PARTICIPANTS TO GO FORWARD. BUT A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION-- HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF THIS CONCEPT -- WOULD ALSO ENABLE PARTICIPANTS TO GO FORWARD. WHAT IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WERE WORKED OUT FOR A YEAR OR TWO YEARS WHILE PARTICIPANTS WERE WORKING OUT FURTHER STEPS. THIS WOULD NOT CREATE A PERMANENT DISADVANTAGE AND IT WOULD HAVE A GOOD EFFECT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE.

56. KHLESTOV SAID THAT AS FOR THE ALLIES' ARGUMENT ON CONFIDENCE THIS COULD BE USED IN SUPPORT OF THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL.

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EASTERN REPS WOULD LIKE WEST TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THIS IDEA AS IT WOULD BE A USEFUL STEP. KHLESTOV SAID EAST SAW TWO MAJOR PLUSSES IN SYMBOLIC APPROACH. IT WOULD BE A FIRST SIGNIFICANT FORWARD MOVEMENT AND IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER CONFIDENCE AMONG ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SINCE, AS GDR REP HAD EMPHASIZED, INCREASING CONFIDENCE REQUIRED CONTRIBUTIONS BY ALL, ALLIED REPS SHOULD THINK OF THE CONFIDENCE PROBLEM IN BROADER TERMS THAN HERETOFORE. ALLIES BELIEVED EAST SHOULD TAKE STEPS IN ADVANCE TO CREATE GREATER CONFIDENCE OF WEST. BUT IN THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION HAD A POLITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF NATO FAR DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE WEST. GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ALSO NEEDED A MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE AND ALLIED REPS SHOULD REALIZE THAT EAST HAD SIMILAR PROBLEM TO WEST AND SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS. THEREFORE A FIRST STEP TAKEN BY ALL WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO TRULY MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP AS REGARDS THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE.

57. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT A FURTHER ASPECT WAS THAT ALTHOUGH

IN THE PRACTICAL AND MILITARY SENSE, THE EASTERN REDUCTION WOULD NOT BE MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THE WESTERN IDEA OF A FREEZE, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT ALLIED REPS NOW APPEAR READY TO ACCEPT A FREEZE, THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE FROM THE VIEWPOINT THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE THE SAME OBLIGATIONS AND THAT ALL WOULD REDUCE EVEN THOUGH THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS MIGHT DIFFER IN INDIVIDUAL CASES. EASTERN REPS BELIEVE THIS SUGGESTION WOULD BE A PRACTICAL WAY TO LEAD TO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF ALLIED REPS COULD GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THE IDEA OF AN INITIAL STEP ON THESE LINES. IF PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO ENGAGE IN A SEARCH FOR AN INITIAL STEP, THEY COULD ALSO CONSIDER INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN THE COURSE OF THIS SEARCH.

58. FRG REP SAID HE WISHED TO ASK A PRACTICAL QUESTION. THE NOVEMBER 8, 1973 EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT HAD CONTAINED A PROPOSAL FOR A FIRST-STEP 20,000 MEN REDUCTION ON EACH SIDE. IN WHAT WAY DID THE PRESENT SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL DIFFER FROM THIS ORIGINAL  
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59. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT THE FIRST STAGE OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFT AGREEMENT WAS A COMPONENT PART OF AN OVERALL DRAFT. THIS PART WAS CONNECTED WITH ALL THE OTHER MEASURES FORESEEN IN THE DRAFT. IT WAS AN ELEMENT OF AN OVERALL INTERCONNECTED PLAN. IT HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN PROPOSED AS AN ELEMENT TIED INTO THE OVERALL APPROACH. ITS ACCEPTANCE WOULD MEAN THAT ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WOULD BE TIED IN. IT WAS PART AND PARCEL OF THE OVERALL EASTERN PLAN. AS CONCERNED THE SUBJECT NOW UNDER DISCUSSION, IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE EASTERN PROGRAM. BUT AS A VEHICLE FOR SEEKING A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. THE ORIGINAL TIED-IN VERSION HAD SUGGESTED A REDUCTION ON EACH SIDE OF 20,000 MEN. IN DEALING WITH THE PRESENT SEPARATE APPROACH ONE COULD CONSIDER DIFFERENT FIGURES. OTHER PROVISIONS COULD ALSO BE DIFFERENT. A SERIES OF NEW ELEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT, TAKING DUE ACCOUNT OF EASTERN AND WESTERN INTEREST. BUT WESTERN REPS COULD NOT HAVE THE GAME ENTIRELY TO THEMSELVES. THEY SHOULD STATE THEIR CONSIDERATIONS AND THE EAST SHOULD STATE ITS. EAST HAD ADVANCED THIS IDEA BECAUSE AFTER THEY HAD PRESENTED THE BENEFITS OF THEIR OVERALL PLAN IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST THE WEST WAS NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT THIS PLAN, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS IT WOULD LATER. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE EAST HAD TRIED TO DEVELOP THE BEGINNING OF AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. IT COULD BE CALLED A FIRST PHASE OR A FIRST



STEP OR A PRELIMINARY STEP OR ANYTHING PARTICIPANTS  
WISHED TO CALL IT.

60. FRG REP SAID THEREFORE, ON THE BASIS OF THIS STATEMENT,  
ONE COULD CONCLUDE THAT, BASICALLY, EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION  
PROPOSAL WAS THAT ENVISAGED BY THE FIRST STAGE OF THE EASTERN  
REDUCTION PROGRAM. THE FIRST STEP COULD BE TAKEN NOW AND  
THE REST LATER. THE FIRST STEP NOW PROPOSED MIGHT CONTAIN SOME  
DIFFERENT PROVISIONS, BUT IT WAS BASICALLY THE SAME AS  
THE ORIGINAL EASTERN FIRST STAGE.

61. KHLESTOV SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. EASTERN REPS  
HAD SUGGESTED A JOINT EFFORT TO DEFINE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE  
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INITIAL STEP. IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE TIED IN WITH THE  
EASTERN IDEA SUGGESTED FOR SECOND AND THIRD STEPS. THERE  
MIGHT BE OTHER POSSIBLE VARIANTS. IT MIGHT BE SPECIFIED  
IN PROVISION THAT THE PRESENT STEP WAS TAKEN TO INSURE  
LATER PROGRESS AND FORWARD MOVEMENT, BUT SUBSEQUENT STEPS  
COULD BE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE FORESEEN IN THE PRESENT  
STAGE TWO AND THREE OF THE EASTERN PROGRAM.

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 EUR-25 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 EB-11 OMB-01 AEC-11

SAM-01 OIC-04 DRC-01 IO-14 /163 W  
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AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
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FROM US REP MBFR

62. BELGIAN REP SAID THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HAD BEEN VALUABLE. IT HAD BEEN INTERESTING TO HEAR SOVIET REP DESCRIBE HOW HE ENVISAGED FIRST STEP AND WHAT SIGNIFICANCE HE ATTACHED TO THE EASTERN SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL, SINCE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EASTERN SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL AND THE EASTERN PLAN OF NOVEMBER 8 HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR. BELGIAN HAD EARLIER SPOKEN OF A NON INCREASE COMMITMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT INFORMAL DISCUSSION, WHICH FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AND SECONDLY AS A WAY BY WHICH OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD INDICATE THEIR WILL TO ASSUME A REDUCTION RESPONSIBILITY EVEN THOUGH NOT FOR THE FIRST PHASE. SOVIET REP'S PRESENT REMARKS DESERVED FURTHER CONSIDERATION, BUT AS THINGS STOOD NOW, HE WOULD WISH TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS IN ANY EVENT. ONE POINT IN SOVIET REP'S REMARKS WHICH HAD STRUCK HIM  
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WAS THE IDEA OF AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN INITIAL STEP OF SOME KIND. HE BELIEVED THIS WAS A POINT TO BE MARKED. SECOND, THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE WAS CLEARLY REALIZED BY BOTH SIDES, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE DIFFERENT VIEWS AS TO HOW BOTH OF THESE GOALS COULD BE ACHIEVED. ANOTHER POINT OF WHICH HE WISHED TO TAKE NOTE WAS VIEW OF SOVIET REP THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT BE PRISONERS OF FORMULAS AND NOMENCLATURE.

63. BELGIAN REP SAID ALLIES HAD TRIED TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNS WITH THEIR NO INCREASE PROPOSAL. IF THEY HAD GONE HALF WAY TOWARDS EASTERN PROPOSALS, AS EASTERN REPS WERE INDICATING, THIS MEANT THAT WHAT ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED WAS WORTH BEING CONSIDERED AS AN IMPORTANT STEP. THE ALLIES DID NOT REJECT A SYMBOLIC REDCUTION PROPOSAL SIMPLY BECAUSE IT MEANT A FREEZE AS SUCH, BUT BECAUSE THE FREEZE WHICH IT ENTAILED WAS OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT NATURE. THE ALLIES WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT A FREEZE OF LIMITED DURATION IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURING A FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF THEIR FIRST PHASE. BUT OTHER DIRECT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WANTED TO KNOW WHERE THEY WERE COMING FROM, THAT IS, A FIRST PHASE, AND WHERE THEY WERE HEADING FOR,

I.E. A COMMON CEILING. THEN THEY WOULD BE READY TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF THE NON INCREASE COMMITMENT. THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT WILLING TO GIVE TROOP REDUCTIONS A COMPLETE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT THEY WERE HEADING FOR.

64. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SUM UP. IF ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO WORK A FIRST STEP, THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL JOINT CONCLUSION. IT WOULD REMAIN A FACT THAT BOTH SIDES HAD TWO DIFFERENT PROGRAMS, BUT BOTH WANTED TO ASSURE A FORWARD MOVEMENT. IF THIS IS WHAT BELGIAN REP HAD JUST SAID, THEN IT WAS A POSITIVE STATEMENT. BELGIAN REP SAID ALLIES HAD IN MIND THEIR FIRST PHASE AS A FIRST STEP. KHLESTOV SAID ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY TO WORK OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE INITIAL STEP. BELGIAN REP SAID ALLIED PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING DO SOMETHING TO START MOVEMENT, AND HAD MADE THE NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL FOR THAT PURPOSE, BUT WERE NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT A FORMULA WHICH INCLUDED REDUCTIONS BY ALL FROM THE OUTSET.

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65. KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT IF ALL PARTICIPANTS CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO WORK OUT A FIRST STEP, THIS WOULD BE A HELPFUL OUTCOME OF PRESENT DISCUSSIONS. THEN THEY SHOULD TRY TO WORK OUT ITS CONTENT. IT WOULD NOT BE THE WESTERN PLAN OR THE EASTERN PLAN, BUT SOMETHING WHICH WOULD BE A COMPROMISE. IT WOULD BE LIMITED IN SCOPE, BUT WOULD ASSURE FORWARD MOVEMENT. AS REGARDS BELGIAN REP'S POINT THAT ALL UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO BUILD UP CONFIDENCE, IT WAS THE EASTERN VIEW THAT THE MILITARY DETENTE WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO POLITICAL DETENTE, SO ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER CONFIDENCE. BOTH SIDES EVIDENTLY HAD DIFFERENT VIEWS OF WHAT WAS NEEDED TO BUILD UP CONFIDENCE. FINALLY, ALLIED REPS HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR IDEA OF A FREEZE WAS CONNECTED WITH THEIR REDUCTION PLAN. THEY HAD CLAIMED TO HAVE MET EASTERN INTERESTS HALF WAY. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHETHER ALLIES HAD COME HALF WAY OR ONE FOURTH OF THE WAY. HE WOULD HAVE TO ADMIT THAT, IN THIS MATTER, THE ALLIES HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT EASTERN CRITICISMS. THE WEST HAD SUGGESTED A FREEZE. EASTERN REPS HAD TRIED TO CLARIFY ALLIED VIEWS AND SAW SOME WEAK POINTS IN ALLIED PROPOSAL. WESTERN REPS WOULD HAVE NOTED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD MADE MANY CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE NON INCREASE PROPOSAL. THIS WAS OBVIOUS FROM WHAT EASTERN REPS HAD SAID ABOUT IT THUS FAR. BUT EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS IDEA IN THE SAME SENSE THAT WESTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS EASTERN PROPOSALS.

66. FRG REP SAID SOVIET REP HAD JUST COMMENTED THAT EAST SAW THAT SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL AS A FIRST STEP. WEST SAW THIS PROPOSAL AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE EASTERN OVERALL REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL. THE EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION IDEA WAS BASED ON REDUCTIONS OF ALL FROM THE OUTSET, IN EQUAL NUMBERS, AND ON THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PRESENT FORCE RELATIONSHIP. THE WEST OPPOSED ALL THESE IDEAS. THE BEST WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS WAS TO TRY TO SETTLE THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS, WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. WESTERN REPS HAD MADE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THESE DISCUSSIONS BY OFFERING AN IMPORTANT SECRET

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ADDITION TO THEIR PHASING PROPOSAL. ALTHOUGH TIME WAS TOO SHORT TO GO INTO DETAILS, THIS PROPOSAL WOULD TAKE CARE OF MUCH OF WHAT EAST TRIED TO ACHIEVE WITH SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS IDEA, AND DO SO IN A MORE ACCEPTABLE WAY.

67. KHLESTOV SAID FRG REP HAD JUST COMMENTED THAT EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS BASED ON ALL MAIN EASTERN REDUCTIONS PRINCIPLES AND HE HAD JUST CITED WESTERN OBJECTIONS TO SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL. EAST WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER VARIANTS. IT HAD PROPOSED THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS CONCEPT SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT INFORMAL DISCUSSION. THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS OTHER POSSIBILITIES IF THE WEST WAS PREPARED TO PUT THEM FORWARD. BUT HE COULD SEE NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN WHAT THE EAST HAD SUGGESTED AND THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE FIRST ISSUE BEFORE THE GROUP WAS WHAT METHOD SHOULD BE USED TO SETTLE THIS QUESTION. ONE METHOD WAS THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE APPROACH. THIS APPROACH WAS PERTINENT TO THE QUESTION. THE EAST HAD ITS OWN REDUCTIONS PLAN, WHICH WAS ALSO PERTINENT TO THE AGREED SUBJECT. POSSIBLY THERE WAS A THIRD METHOD OF SETTLING THE ISSUE. WHAT EAST WAS TRYING TO DO WAS TO FIND THE METHOD OF RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. BOTH SIDES SHOULD SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN TRYING TO FIND DIFFERENT METHODS.

68. US REP SAID HE WISHED TO REITERATE THAT ALLIES HAD MADE AN IMPORTANT SUGGESTION WHICH AUGMENTED THE PROPOSAL THE ALLIES HAD ADVANCED PRIOR TO THE EASTER BREAK. WESTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THIS POSSIBILITY IN PRESENT SESSION AND WELCOMED THIS DISCUSSION AS HELPFUL. WESTERN REPS BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK OUT THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH AROSE FROM THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL. WESTERN REPS HOPED THAT EAST WOULD SHOW THEIR INTEREST IN MAKING PROGRESS BY

MAKING A MOVE OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ONE ALLIES HAD  
JUST MADE RELATING TO THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD  
BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

69. US REP PROPOSED, AND IT WAS AGREED, THAT THE NEXT  
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INFORMAL SESSION WOULD TAKE PLACE ON JUNE THE 4TH.RESOR

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